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LEGAL ETHICS AND THE
RESTATEMENT PROCESS - THE
SOMETIMES-UNCOMFORTABLE FIT
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM*
At focus in this article is a single element of the restatement process - the extent
to which the Restatement comports with "legal ethics," a term I will have to define.
As indicated by the title, I consider the fit to be an uncomfortable one at times.
Discomfort stems from two root causes. First, as a deliberate policy decision, the
American Law Institute has determined that the Restatement will not include any
consideration of a nonlegal nature. The Restatement, as we have often had occasion
to insist, is about law, and nothing else. Second, and perhaps more troubling, some
of what the Restatement consequently will restate as law will and should disturb
those who are concerned with legal ethics. Nonetheless, I will argue that tension,
on both scores, is both inevitable and the product of a correct choice.
Defining "Legal Ethics"
I should begin by being as clear as I can about what is covered by this excluded
domain of "legal ethics." That is not a matter upon which one can be terribly clear,
unless dealing in gross terms, as I am. All scholars in legal ethics have a well-
founded understanding of what legal ethics is as opposed to law. However, they are
also familiar with the fact that a considerable degree of grey surrounds many
attempted definitions of the term. While there are important and subtle differences
to be recognized for other purposes, for our present review I will simply define
"legal ethics" as every sort of normative statement or quality ascription that one
might apply to the actions of a lawyer or law firm except narrowly legal statements
or ascriptions.!
Considerations of "legal ethics," for example, are concerned with personal ethics
- the aspects of a life scheme which, at any moment, an actor employs to assess
whether what she is doing as a lawyer is appropriate. "Legal ethics," in the broad
sense I use the term, also includes scholarly analyses of the work of lawyers by
professional moral philosophers - for example, the work of Professor David Luban
* Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor, Cornell Law School; Reporter, Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers. LL.B., 1962, University of Texas; A.B., 1959, Notre Dame. This article is a revised
version of remarks that Professor Wolfram delivered as a speaker during the Symposium on the evolving
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. Professor Wolfram's views do not necessarily reflect the
position of the American Law Institute.
1. My rough-hewn definition will remind you, perhaps, of Samuel Johnson's definitions of political
parties: a Tory, Johnson wrote in his dictionary, is a member of Parliament opposed to the Whigs, and
a Whig he defined as one opposed to the Tories. In both events, I trust you know something of what we
mean. SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755) (entries for "Tory" and
"Whig").
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and Professor Alan Goldman and others who have recently made the practice of law
their focus Such moral philosophers have attempted systematically to analyze the
activities of lawyers in view of considerations of moral philosophy, by reference to
principles of philosophy that transcend the practice of law. I also include as legal
ethics whatever it is that often drives and defines the work of those legal-ethics
committees who attempt to tell lawyers what to do, based often on unstated
considerations of legal ethics that are different and disassociated from the
prescriptive text of lawyer codes and norms derived from those texts. Those
different norms somchow flow from the brow, as it were, of the committee
members.
I also intend to include in my definition of legal ethics what is sometimes
referred to as professional ethics. In fact, this may well be the same thing as the set
of considerations to which I just referred, in the case of drafters of some ethics
committee opinions. Professional ethics, as I use the term here, reflects a set of
more-or-less shared professional ideals that lawyers in a practice community
observe, and expect their peers to observe, in their practice and professional
interactions. Such professional ideals are often inchoate and often place great stock
in professional traditions, professional mythology, and economic, reputational, and
similar parochial interests of lawyers as a distinct group. Sometimes the ideals are
laudable; sometimes not. We have all heard lawyers make statements of the
following kind: "I don't care what the law provides; I don't care what the lawyer
codes say; I feel the following about the following problem." What ensues is a
recital of a position and the reasons in support of it that have nothing to do with the
commands of lawyer codes or other legally binding prescriptions. Whatever else the
lawyer is saying, she is not talking about anything that is within the compass of the
Restatement.
Exclusion of "Legal Ethics"from the Restatement
Take all the preceding as an encompassing conversational description of what it
is that the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers does not deal with. All that
the Restatement deals with, then, is law. Now, excluding in that way all consider-
ation of legal ethics from the Restatement may strike some observers of the
restatement process as quizzical. Indeed, it strikes some of those observers as
perverse. Yet this is ctearly an important limitation on what we are attempting to
do in the Restatement. Indeed, each tentative draft, preliminary draft, and council
draft now being publi;hed in the project carries at its outset a kind of "surgeon
general's warning" in a boilerplate paragraph early in the reporter's memorandum
in the front matter of the draft. This boilerplate warning first appeared in Tentative
2. E.g., ALAN H. GOLDIIAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics (1980); DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); THE GOOD LAWYER (David Luban ed.,
1984). For works by law-trained writers working from a similar perspective, see CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT
AND WRONG (1978); THOM/S L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981); THOMAS
L. SHAFFER & MARY L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS & THEIR COMMUNITIES (1991).
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Draft No. 4 in 199 1,' although it then simply documented what had been a practice
for two or three years' standing in writing the Restatement.
Here is the text of the boilerplate warning from Tentative Draft No. 5 - the
March 1992 document - and I can assure you that this language will appear in the
reporter's memorandum in all subsequent drafts:
We take this occasion to remind readers that, as with all work on this
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, this draft aims to restate
the law. It reflects decisional law and statutes and takes account of the
lawyer codes in its formulations. The formulations are a statement of
the law applicable in malpractice and disqualification proceedings and
other contexts to which that body of law is applicable. It also may
inform the interpretation of the lawyer codes in disciplinary and similar
proceedings. Because this is a Restatement of the Law, the black letter
and Comment do not discuss other important subjects, such as matters
of sound professional practice or personal or professional morality or
ethics. Such other non-legal considerations may be referred to in the
Reporter's Notes, but those discussions do not, as is traditional,
constitute the position of the Institute.4
The wording was worked out in notes that Professor Hazard and I passed back
and forth during one discussion in which confusion on the subject had arisen. It was
designed to address two issues that had proved nettlesome in our work to that point.
One concern derived from our attempt in earlier drafts of the Restatement to make
statements about what we called (in our parlance in earlier drafts, now abandoned)
considerations of "sound professional practice." As many warned, Victor Levit
among them, and as we eventually agreed, our ideas about what constituted sound
professional practice did incur the rather significant risk that a court might
misapprehend what we were saying and mistake sound professional practice pointers
for statements of normative legal rules that were to be enforced, for example, in
legal malpractice and other areas of lawyer liability.
A second and more pervasive problem, which even more insistently called for the
boilerplate, involves ongoing confusion about what it is that the Restatement is
trying to be at its most fundamental level. That problem in turn stems from two
sources. I occasionally detect the belief on the part of participants or observers that
the process of producing the Restatement is similar to the intensely political process
within the ABA that produced, for example, the 1983 Model Rules of Professional
Conducts A second and related source of potential confusion is the experience of
3. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAv GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT DRAFr No. 4].
4. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS at xxiii-xxiv (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992);
see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS at xxiii-xxiv (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1993)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT DRAFt No. 6].
5. For a perceptive examination of the ABA's process of generating the 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, see Theodore J. Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the
1993]
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the ALI itself during the dozen years, now mercifully coming to a close, in which
the Institute drafted the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance.6 Unlike either of
those efforts, however, the Restatement project was not intended as a reprise of
either of those open-onded drafting exercises. We definitely are not working on a
clean slate, as were the Kutak Commission and the ABA House of Delegates with
the Model Rules and the ALI itself with the Corporate Governance project,
unconstrained by anything other than internal group politics and a rough criteria of
"adoptability" in the states. We have not set out to improve upon points settled in
the lawyer codes or to make suggestions for their modification.7 In short, the
boilerplate language reflects the commitment of the Restatement to concentrate on
restating existing "law" rather than on making bold new recommendations of brand
new ways of regulating lawyer conduct to the states and other jurisdictions that
govern lawyers.8
Resorting to metaphor, the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers attempts
to restate the law of its subject in the same way that the Restatement of the Law of
Agency9 attempts to restate that important and very relevant body of law, in the
same way that the Restatement of Contracts"° purports to restate the body of the
law of contracts, and so on. Some sections of the lawyers' restatement, very few
as it turns out, focus on conduct governed only by provisions of the lawyer codes."
A few other sections deal with lawyer conduct regulated largely or entirely by
statute or administrative regulation. 2 Except in occasional references in nonofficial
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989).
6. The announced last tentative publication is ALl PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft, 1992).
7. A related question his bedeviled us in drafting certain sections: should the reporters draft the best
possible version of language for black-letter principles, or should we confine ourselves largely to the
formulations employed in widely adopted lawyer codes, no matter how defective those formulations
might be? As a rule of thumb, we will follow lawyer code language if we restate a principle that is both
universally observed in the states and stated in the same or substantially similar language in both the
ABA Model Code and the ABA Model Rules. We also employ ABA Model Rules formulations that
have been very widely adopted in the states. More precise tinkering with concepts that are thus unartfully
expressed is done in the comments to the section. At the very least, that policy avoids creating the
impression among lawyer code coguoscenti that variant language implies an intent to state a variant
concept.
8. Compare Joel Seligman, A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of
Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325 (1987) with Roswell B. Perkins, The AL!
Corporate Governance Project in Midstream, 41 Bus. LAw. 1195 (1986).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY (1957).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979).
11. In fact, a post-symposium search of sections written to date indicates only minor and scattered
provisions that fit the description in the text. For example, see RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 4, supra note
3, § 56(2) (duty of lawyer promptly to render full accounting to client on request). Almost every other
section involves a legal rula that is enforceable also or only in civil or criminal litigation outside the
context of professional discipline.
12. The most obvious example is the topic on the work-product doctrine, which is largely governed
in the federal and most state systems by court rules or procedural statutes. See RESTATEMENT DRAFT No.
6, supra note 4, §§ 136-143; see, e.g., RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 4, supra note 3, § 55 cmt. b
(recognition of statutory retaining liens); id. § 214 cmt. a (recognition of statutes and regulations
[Vol. 46:13
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reporter's notes, however, we do not purport to recommend change in either
accepted statutory, regulatory, or lawyer code formulations or doctrine.
An exception to what one might otherwise take to be the overbreadth of that
commitment concerns an important matter that is not an exception after all. Where
there is a significant difference among the lawyer code formulations among
jurisdictions - or in statutory or administrative formulations - we choose that
formulation that seems to us to be the most reasonable and responsible in view of
all relevant doctrinal and policy considerations. We do not do so gratuitously. A
choice is inescapably forced upon anyone seeking to restate when the "law" of the
several American jurisdictions differs. For us to have used as a rule of choice in
restating the nation's law governing lawyers the view of the law stated in, for
example, the ABA Model Rules would have been just as arbitrary (and often as
misleading) as to have chosen to follow the law of, say, New York or California.
Despite the variations that undoubtedly exist among the American jurisdictions, that
approach still leaves a great deal of the law well set in concrete.
Also different, of course, are areas of the law governing lawyers that are
controlled largely or entirely by common law. There we follow an important
American Law Institute tradition and policy that, although still controversial, has
stood for more than thirty years. A controversy erupted within the Institute in the
late 1950s over the proposal of Professor William L. Prosser, then the reporter for
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to amend section 402A on products liability, as
it is now called. 3 As a result of that controversy, it is now well settled (but hardly
unchallenged) Institute policy that the reporter for a restatement may recommend
any position on a proposition of common law that can be supported by resort to
traditional common law materials. As some have put it, the ALI proceeds as if the
entire United States were a single, unitary common law jurisdiction. 4
Accordingly, if extant legal material anywhere in that very large jurisdiction
supports a common law position, the reporters may urge it. It can, of course, be
rejected in favor of a competing proposition similarly derived, but at least it is
legitimate, according to this policy, to urge it upon the Institute. A prominent
example of this approach is the formulation that the reporters recommended and,
indeed, was approved in section 55 of Tentative Draft No. 4, which was just
considered at the 1992 annual meeting. In section 55, the reporters urged, and the
providing stricter limitations on representations in private practice by former government lawyers);
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS at 72 introductory note (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1989)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT DRAFT NO. 2] (recognition ofstatutory definitions of attorney-client privilege).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
14. Arthur L. Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law Institute, 15 IOWA
L. REV. 19, 21 (1929) (quoting Address of Elihu Root in Presenting the Report of the Committee
[Organizing the Institute], I A.L.I. PROC. pt. II, at 48, 48 (1923)); WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND THE FIRST RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: "How WE DID IT,"
RESTATEMENTS IN THE COURTS 1, 2 (1945).
15. Section 55 first appeared in RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 4, supra note 3. It was approved at the
May meeting in 1992. See ALI REP., October 1992, at 14.
1993]
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ALI's council and members have tentatively approved, a position that very
substantially narrows what most jurisdictions accept as common law retaining liens
for lawyers. A large majority of American jurisdictions that have common law on
retaining liens allow such liens a very broad scope.'6 A lawyer may grab and hold
almost any property she comes into possession of that belongs to the client, in order
to secure payment of the lawyer's claim for a fee. There is, however, common law
authority in a small number of American jurisdictions, including California, that
essentially states that there can be no common law retaining lien at all. 7 There can
be consensual liens specifically contracted between client and lawyer and, of course,
statutory liens, but no common law retaining liens. We have followed that minority
view - and, I would argue, quite defensibly so. But we do so legitimately only
because there is common law support, as I say, in the global or national American
common law jurisdiction.
Where the Shoe Pinches
If you are like most academics - who seem not to like the common law
retaining lien - you might be wondering at this point what is so uncomfortable
about the distance that the Restatement attempts to place between law and legal
ethics. I can illustrate the discomfort by referring to two other areas of controversy:
one that has already erupted and one that, I predict, even guarantee, will erupt. Both
concern common law i'ules that probably must be treated as entirely well settled, but
I think many of us regret them very much. I think, in shoit, that the law is wrong,
although it is fairly clear to me that we must restate it as it exists. It is also my
impression that we have encountered instances of this latter sort - where there is
A bibliographic note: Keeping track of action on tentative drafts of the Restatement takes some
digging. For the ALI's official purposes, the annual volume of the ALl Proceedings for the annual
meeting consists mainly of a transcript of the discussion of each draft actually considered by the
membership, showing the etent of coverage, motions to amend and the like, along with the votes taken
on preliminary motions and each section. (An instance of such a process and citation to the 1991 volume
of the ALI Proceedings is contained in infra note 33). Sometimes approval of a draft is by cumulative
action on a motion made at the end of the period of consideration. Occasionally, approval is on a
"rolling" basis, with acquietcence noted as the presiding officer passes the meeting from one section to
another.
Unfortunately, an ALl Proceedings volume typically appears only after a long interval, usually only
about the time of the following year's meeting. In the meantime, the next best source is the ALI's
newsletter, the ALI Reporter (cited supra); each year the October issue highlights action taken at the
preceding May meeting. Unfortunately, the ALI Reporter is often not included into the largest law school
libraries' collection of reference works, although it is sent by the ALl to many of those libraries.
Less authoritatively but much more expeditiously, two publications of the Bureau of National Affairs
law publishing company - United States Law Week and the ABA/ENA Laivyers' Manual on Professional
Conduct - publish in their last issue each May a journalistic account, usually quite perceptive, of
discussion and action taken at the ALI's annual meeting. However, the BNA coverage will inevitably
contain gaps, particularly when the ALl splits its annual meeting into two sessions, as it has sometimes
done in recent years in order to expedite consideration of tentative drafts in a large number of projects.
16. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs 559 (1986) [hereinafter,
VOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL EnTICs].
17. Id.; RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 4, supra note 3, § 55 cmt. b reporter's note.
[Vol. 46:13
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dissonance between what the common law must be said to be and what I, at least,
would have it be - as a matter of legal ethics in the broad ways that I originally
defined it. Nor is the dissonance faint. I think instances of dissonance are common,
even if not as common as are instances of agreement between common law
formulations and legal ethics.
The first legal rule was captured in illustration 4 of section 132.8 There we
essentially sketched the facts of and reached the same result as the well-known
Arizona decision, State v. Macumber.'9 Macumber was on trial for his life in a
capital murder case. He wanted to call to the witness stand two lawyers who would
testify that a former jointly represented client of theirs, now deceased, had told them
in confidence that he (and not Macumber) had committed the murder for which
Macumber was on trial. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the testimony was
properly excluded by the trial court under the attorney-client privilege.
Illustration 4 agreed that the Macumber holding reflected the law in the United
States.' In fact, the Restatement apparently approved it, as well as a corollary,
which stated that the lawyers involved were required to invoke the privilege
themselves, on behalf of their deceased client, when called to testify and even if no
one else objected or urged them to object.' For those who may have spotted the
point, there is no issue in Macumber or the illustration of the crime-fraud exception
to the privilege. What the deceased client had confessed to the lawyers was a past
act already committed, not a future act, and therefore, under traditional doctrine, the
communication was clearly outside that exception to the attorney-client privilege.'
18. See RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 2, supra note 12, § 132 cmt. e, illus. 4. Some people (I among
them) would similarly question the Institute's position in id. § Ill cmt. b, illus. 1, at least in some
imaginable instances. We there, essentially, state that the refusal of the lawyer in the Buried Bodies case
to inform parents of a murdered young woman of the fact of their daughter's death and the location of
her body was both defensible and required. The decision on which the illustration is based is People v.
Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975), afTfd, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. Div.), affd, 359
N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976). The trial court quashed criminal charges against the lawyer filed under a statute
requiring anyone knowing of the death of a person unattended by a physician to report the death, based
on the attorney-client privilege. But the court noted that, if the indictment had been based on a charge
of obstruction of justice, "the work of this Court would have been much more difficult." Id. at 803. For
a bibliography of works discussing the case, see WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 16, at
664-65 nn.2-8. While the trial court's opinion might be read to suggest that the provisions of New
York's then lawyer code imposed a duty to disclose, on reflection we concluded that no support for such
a duty could be found in any lawyer code.
19. 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976).
20. Id. at 1086. But see id. at 1087-88 (special concurrence of Holohan, J., and Cameron, C.J.).
21. See supra note 18.
22. See RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 2, supra note 3, § 115 cmt. c ("A lawyer generally is required
to raise any reasonably available objection to an attempt by another person to obtain confidential client
information from the lawyer if revealing the information would disadvantage the lawyer's client ... ").
23. E.g., RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 2, supra note 12, § 132 cmt. b; JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL I 18.03[07][a] (1992); WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 16, § 6.4.10, at 280-81.
1993]
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I confess that our motives in choosing this particular illustration were mixed. I
defended the illustration on the floor of the Institute on the ground that it captured
in a compelling factual setting the legally defined operation of a number of relevant
doctrines having to do with the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, I think the
result in Macumber follows from well-settled American legal principles. But I also
think the result stinks! Under no moral calculus that I can subscribe to is it
supportable that the law should prefer protection of the confidentiality interests of
a deceased and (at least according to the proposed testimony) self-confessed
murderer over the interests of a live person threatened with execution for a crime
he did not commit. Nonetheless, that seems to be the logic of the privilege in the
United States. English law, by the way, agrees with the moral imperative I have
expressed. In English courts, the "professional privilege" can be overcome in
Macumber-type situatrons. Indeed, it can be overcome in any instance of criminal
prosecution, including noncapital cases (which, of course, is what all prosecutions
there are). The exception applies in any instance in which a solicitor (barristers
never talk to clients about the facts) would be prepared to testify that a former client
confessed to a crime for which another person is now on trial.' In short, my
second motivation was to have Macumber do a Bleak House number on some
applications of the privilege itself, portraying it as wooden and wrong in at least
some of its extreme applications.'
My second example of what I am here calling the uncomfortable fit between law
and legal ethics in the Restatement has not yet appeared in publicly available form,
and perhaps never will. Nonetheless, with the exception of one of our colleagues
whose views I agree with on nonlegal grounds, it has been relatively noncontrover-
sial in meetings with the advisers and members consultative groups that have
already reviewed a fir t preliminary draft dealing with the legal issues involved in
24. R. v. Barton, [19731 1 W.L.R. 115. The point is well accepted in modem English evidence law.
See generally M. N. HOWAPD, PHIPSON ON EvIDENCE 20-25 (14th ed. 1990); COLIN TAPPER, CROSS ON
EvIDENCE 399-400 (6th ed. 1985).
25. Although we differ on much else in the law of confidentiality (see infra note 27 and
accompanying text), I here agree with the preferred position of Professor Monroe H. Freedman with
respect to cases such as Ma,umber where life is at stake, a general exception to confidentiality should
be recognized, and it should not be limited to threats to life caused only by a client's intended wrongful
act. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 103 (1990). In working on
revisions to what are now sections 117A and 117B - the fraud exception to the agency-law prohibition
against disclosing a client's intent to commit a future crime or fraud - we have revisited the extent to
which a lawyer may reveal ctherwise confidential information in order to save lives. Although the matter
is complex, we will probably recommend that the Institute follow the narrow exception stated, for
example, in Model Rule 1.6(b) - recognizing a lawyer's right (not duty) to disclose only where the
client's wrongful act threatens future loss of life or substantial bodily injury because of a client's
wrongful act. For an earlier version of the section, see RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 1 17A(1) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1990) ("discussion draft" of section providing for disclosure
in life-threatening situations only when "the client intends to commit a crime or fraud that threatens to
cause death or serious bodily injury"). In Macumber, by contrast, no wrongful act of the now-deceased




LEGAL ETHICS & THE RESTATEMENT
lawyer advocacy.' The question is much discussed in legal ethics classrooms but
virtually ignored in reported decisions. The question is this: may (or must?) a
lawyer cross-examine a witness where: (a) the lawyer can effectively impeach the
testimony on credibility or similar grounds, but (b) the lawyer knows the testimony
to be entirely truthful? A standard illustration is one Monroe Freedman used back
in 1966 and has repeatedly employed since then." A casual-bystander witness
testifies truthfully in a criminal prosecution that she saw the accused at a certain
intersection at an early hour of the morning while walking her dog.= The evidence
is highly probative of guilt of the accused because it places the accused, only five
minutes after the commission of a horrible crime, at an intersection a block away
from the scene of the crime, which was committed in the early hours of the
morning when few other people were about. The problem for the witness (and the
prosecution) is that the witness is elderly, speaks haltingly, perhaps in the foreign
accents of a disfavored minority group, and wears thick glasses (which, nonetheless,
adequately correct her vision).
We have taken the position in early drafts that the lawyer may attempt to cross-
examine the witness and may attempt to persuade the fact finder not to accept the
known-to-be-true testimony. Much can be said on moral grounds about the proper
legal result' Nonetheless, I think we have got the law right - the law does
provide that the lawyer is at least permitted to cross-examine a known truthful
witness. The practice of lawyers is rather uniformly to attack truthful testimony,
when doing so is to a client's advantage, and no extant legal material of a common
law sort indicates otherwise.
26. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 152 cmt. d (Council Draft No. 9, 1992)
("inhere is no legal rule prohibiting a lawyer from cross-examining a witness with respect to testimony
that the lawyer knows to be truthful."). Council Draft No. 9 contained the text of a proposed chapter on
lawyer advocacy. We are currently considering combining that material with material in Preliminary
Draft No. 8, from 1992, on assisting clients in matters outside litigation. The revised or combined
chapters will appear in preliminary draft form, according to present plans, in early 1994.
27. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1474 (1966); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS
IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 48 (1975); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 113-
14 (1990).
28. The illustration formed the basis for one of Professor Freedman's "three hardest questions." See
supra note 27. Professor Freedman's version of the illustration has the accused innocent of the crime,
guilty only of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The morally more difficult version of the
illustration occurs, of course, when the client-defendant is guilty.
29. Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) states that a lawyer may not knowingly "offer" evidence that the lawyer
knows to be false. (For those bothered by a possibly clumsy paraphrase, both "knowingly" and "knows"
redundantly appear in the text of the rule.) By a subtle, but accepted, convention, the lawyer cross-
examining a known truthful witness arguably does not fall afoul of the rule. It could be argued that
evidence offered by the lawyer - that the witness is old, that the witness wears thick glasses, that the
nighttime encounter was brief and under poor lighting - is all true. What is false (in all but certain,
specialized legal senses) is the inference that the advocate is transparently seeking to suggest: that the
witness is mistaken or lying in identifying the accused as the person in guilty proximity to the crime
scene.
1993]
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Here again, however, in my estimation the law is wrong, and very wrong. If one
accepts the factual proposition, and of course not everyone does, that in practice a
lawyer on occasion can differentiate confidently between the truth and falsity of
testimony, then it seems to me that the law should be quite otherwise from what it
is. The rule should be something like "a lawyer is prohibited from attacking




So Why Restate Bad Law?
I will not pretend that I have sufficiently demonstrated either that lawyers should
be permitted to testify to the confidentially confessed crimes of a now-deceased
client for which an innocent person is on trial, or that lawyers should be prohibited
from attacking known truthful testimony. If one happens not to agree that there is
substantial dissonance in those two instances between what the law requires or
permits and what legal ethics (as we define it for this purpose) would require or
permit, I am confident that anyone conversant with problems in the field will with
little difficulty be able to identify at least a small bushel-basketful of other examples
of such dissonance. If I accurately perceive that such dissonance pervades the
Restatement, why restate such law? Why not follow the advice frequently urged
upon us reporters and simply ignore those points where the law is unfortunate? We
could simply say nothing about it. Indeed, it is argued to us that there is something
subversive to the interests of legal ethics in stating as law a proposition that one
finds seriously offensive on the ground of legal ethics. If we refuse to give free
publicity to such doctrines, some lawyers out there who do not know about them
might misapprehend what the law is and therefore feel free to do what their
(appropriate) sense of legal ethics would seem to require. Won't a restatement that
restates such objectiopable doctrine both confirm those lawyers who already conduct
themselves in minimally legal but morally objectionable ways and even provide a
basis for others to argue that such a course of advocacy should be required of all
lawyers on the ground of competence, setting bad law in a kind of legal concrete?
All those objections may be well founded, at least in the sense that some such
consequences may follow. Nonetheless, I believe that restating bad law is, where
necessary because of the absence of any legal basis for doing otherwise, both
justifiable and even beneficial.
On the heading of justiciability, I believe that we academics are in an important
sense curators of the law. When we teach or conduct our scholarship according to
a high standard, we face legal doctrine full-on, warts and all. We face it in all its
inspiring glory, to be sure, but with all of its shortcomings as well. Like any other
field of law, the law governing lawyers is hardly perfect in the sense of being fully
integral with the moral values of most individuals. But the field will become no
30. The descriptive adjectives are not redundant. In my view, a prohibition against attacking
evidence should apply only when the advocate knows that the evidence is both truthful, in the sense that
the witness is not consciously misstating a fact, and accurate, in the sense that the fair inferences of what
the witness is stating correspond to historical fact as the lawyer knows it or reasonably believes it to be.
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better if it is portrayed - like one of Marie Antoinette's garden parties celebrating
the imagined idyllic lives of French peasants - as if the law governing lawyers
were free of serious flaws at a deep doctrinal level. Both the morally appropriate
and the morally dubious should be portrayed as all courts apparently would apply
the law, given present legal materials. Only in that way cdn the legal landscape be
seen, both whole and accurately, for what it is. Only then can reformers, if there
is to be reform, address what is wrong with lawyer regulation in light of what is
right about it.
Is then the restating process a regressive process, an anti-reformist exercise, as
many have thought, or is it something else? The question and the attempt to answer
it are problems of long standing. I have heard it said in conversation, for example,
that at least one of the justices of the Warren Court had an invariable policy,
enforced upon his law clerks, of refusing to cite any of the ALI's restatements
because of this justice's belief that the ALI represented primarily backward forces
in American law. On the other hand, some of the most well-known controversies
in the ALI's history have revolved around ALI proposals that could not be
considered anti-reform by any measure. Let me only bring to mind, again, the
adoption of Professor Prosser's section 402A of the torts restatement. By most
accounts, section 402A, for good or for ill or for much of both, was a principal
impetus to unleashing the torrent of decisions in state supreme courts that led to the
present contretemps in the law of products liability - the concept of liability
without fault for defective products. To choose a much more contemporary
example, much of the work of the ALI on the Corporate Governance project,3 just
being completed, can hardly be considered other than reformist. In fact, at least one
legal historian who has appraised the ALI's restatements concludes, to use my own
words, that at least the early efforts were a conspiracy of reform-minded law
professors, judges, and lawyers to reshape American law according to largely
progressive ideals. 2
Whatever the ALI's past history, how should the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers be judged - reformist, regressive, or otherwise? I for one am
quite content to leave the ultimate judgment to history, including whatever history
ensues of judicial acceptaice or rejection of our work.33 I am persuaded that an
31. See supra notes 6, 8.
32. N. E. H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law
Institute, 8 LAw & HisT. Rev. 55 (1990).
33. Some stirring among courts has already occurred. A recent example are the several opinions in
Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Smolen, 837 P.2d 894 (Okla. 1992), in which a divided court held that the court
should accept a stipulated agreement that a lawyer should be publicly disciplined (censured) for providing
funds for living expenses to clients who, according to the court's statement of the stipulated facts, "were
destitute, without other means and resources or credit to obtain loans for sustenance during the pendency
of their disability and in many cases could not work because of their injury." Id. at 895. A dissenting
opinion urged that Oklahoma consider adopting the position taken in the RESTATEMENT DRAFr No. 4,
supra note 3, § 48(2)(b), that a lawyer should be permitted to make or guarantee a loan to an existing
client for living expenses in extremely needful circumstances. Smolen, 837 P.2d at 900-01 (Kauger, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). A special concurrence agreed that the court should consider
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overly or overtly reformist mindset would be an exercise in futility. Most obviously,
the membership of the Institute and the processes of the ALI would not permit an
aggressive reshaping of the American law governing lawyers. Even if, improbably
enough, one believed that marches could be stolen on an insufficiently vigilant ALI
membership, I believe that the membership of the ALI rather accurately, and on
most matters, reflects the mindset of judges in courts of last resort in the states.
Judges could not be collectively fooled into believing that the law governing
lawyers is other than what it is - an imperfectly realized body of law that in some
important respects is out of line with what considerations of legal ethics would have
it be. In no sense will the Restatement, even if followed in all the states, complete
the work of reform of the legal profession. That work, and the work of this section
and its members, will hardly come to an end following the four or five more years
of work on the Restatement. In a way of viewing it, the Restatement does not even
clear away all of the underbrush. But it at least may serve to indicate where the
underbrush needs the further attention of would-be reformers of our profession. In
that perhaps modest way, the Restatement will have aided the work of reforming the
American legal profession.
adopting the Restatement's position, but only after the final text of the Restatement had emerged. Id. at
906 (Opala, Ci., concurrirg).
In events that probably occurred too near the time of the Oklahoma court's decision on July 14, 1992,
the position in the RESTATEMENT DRAFr No. 4, supra note 3, § 48(2)(b), was the subject of a motion
to delete at the 1991 annual meeting on the afternoon of Thursday, May 16. See ALI, PROCEEDINGS
1991: 68TH ANNUAL MEETnNG OF THE AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE 518-21 (1992). The motion lost by
a vote of 78-74. An ensuing motion was made to require the lawyer not to make or discuss tIle loan
before the lawyer is retained. Id. at 522. It carried, by a vote of 75-74. Id. at 525. A subsequent motion
to recommit the section was defeated by voice vote, id. at 529, and the section was tentatively approved
as amended, id. at 531. Th matter is obviously one on which lawyers have sharply differing views and
beliefs. My personal view is that the Restatement position is sound. It is followed in Minnesota, a hotbed
of innovative and middle-of-the-road lawyer rules, and a few other states. See id. at 519 (remarks of
Professor Kenneth E. Kirwin on the Minnesota experience); RESTATEMENT DRAFr No. 4, supra note 3,
§ 48 cmt. d reporter's note (citing relevant, recent authority in California, Minnesota, North Dakota, and
Texas).
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